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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law-No Trial De Novo From Order
Of The Texas Liquor Board Cancelling A Private Club
Permit
The Administrator of the Texas Liquor Control Board cancelled
the private club registration permit of the Club Apache. An appeal
from this action was perfected to a district court of Dallas County.
The trial judge found that the statute granting a trial de novo on
an appeal from the Administrator's ruling was unconstitutional. The
district court applied the substantial evidence rule and over-ruled
the Liquor Control Board's decision. Held, reversed: The Texarkana
Court of Civil Appeals stated that since the action taken by the
Liquor Control Board was administrative rather than judicial, the
substantial evidence rule should be used in judicial review. The court
found, however, that there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the Administrator's cancellation of the private club
registration permit. Texas Liquor Control Board v. Longwill, 392
S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
The Texas Legislature in 1961 enacted art. 666-15(e) of the
Texas Liquor Control Act. This statute created a regulatory system
for private clubs serving alcoholic beverages. The provision of this
act pertaining to review' states that an appeal from a cancellation
order of the Liquor Control Board shall be de novo under the rules
governing ordinary civil actions, and that the substantial evidence
rule shall have no application in the proceedings of the district court.
This direction for a trial de novo conflicts with paragraph (d) of
subdivision 7a which provides: "The order, decision or ruling of
the Board or Administrator may be suspended or modified by the
District Court pending a trial on the merits, but the final judgment
of the District Court shall not be modified or suspended pending
appeal.. . ."' This seems to imply that the Administrator's order will
continue in effect during appeal unless it is suspended or modified
by the district court pending a trial on the merits. The general rules
established regarding a trial de novo are contra. "The sine qua non
of a de novo trial . . .is the nullification of the judgment or order
of the first tribunal and a retrial of the issues .... When jurisdiction
'TEx. PENAL CODE art. 666-15(e)
2 Ibid.

subd. 7a (1961).
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of the second tribunal attaches, the judgment or order of the first
tribunal is not merely suspended, but is nullified."' The provisions
directing a trial de novo and implying a continuation in effect of
the Administrator's order seem to require the district court to treat
such orders as being simultaneously both valid and invalid.
The majority opinion resolves this difficulty by first determining
that the Liquor Control Board's function in this area is administrative rather than judicial: "The conclusion that the Board's action
in cancelling Club Apache's permit is an administrative act necessitates the further conclusion that a review of its order may only be
made to determine whether substantial evidence supports it."4 The
statute that calls for a trial de novo rather than application of the
substantial evidence rule conflicts "with the provisions of Section 1,
Art. II, Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann. St., dividing the functions
of government and is void."'

J.M.W.

Common Carriers

-

Limited Motor Carrier's Certifi-

cate
Respondent held a Limited Common Carrier Motor Carrier's Certificate issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas which authorized
him to transport only heavy construction materials.' Respondent was
hauling building materials which, if handled individually, would
be manageable by a regular carrier, but the commodities were
strapped on 2000 pound shipping pallets in such a manner that the
use of a fork lift was necessary to handle the unitized loads. The
state sought a declaratory judgment that he was transporting unauthorized commodities. The trial court held that respondent was
authorized to carry such a palletized unit because special handling
equipment was required for loading and unloading. The court of
civil appeals ruled that the palletized units were within respondent's
authority only to the extent that an aggregation was required by
'Southern

Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Engineers, 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619

(1958).
4
Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Longwill, 392 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
5 Ibid.
' The certificate was issued pursuant to the authority in TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 911b.
Heavy construction materials are only those which are inappropriate as cargo for regular
common carriers and which generally require the use of special loading and unloading equipment.
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the inherent nature of the commodities involved. Rolls of building
paper, roofing and siding and bundles of shingles were found to
possess such an "inherent nature."' Held, reversed: A carrier's authorization to transport materials is determined by the individual commodity unless the inherent nature of the commodity requires aggregation. There was insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that any
of the commodities transported by respondent required such an
aggregation. State v. Bilbo, 392 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1965).
The principal case effectively aligns Texas courts with the position
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in determining the authority
of a limited carrier. The general rule that the individual commodity
is the controlling consideration has been clearly established by a
series of ICC cases. However, in recent years an exception to this
rule has been developed which is not as clearly defined: if an aggregation is required by the inherent nature of the commodity, it is
the character of the minimum bundle which determines if it is within
the limited carrier's authority.
In a recent ICC decision, sheets of metal were held to require
aggregation because individually they are "unstable, subject to bending or other damage, and . . .awkward or impossible to handle." 4
In a later case the Commission purported to confine the exception
"within its strictest limits," and promulgated the rule of construction that a presumption against its application would inhere "in the
absence of a sound basis for concluding to the contrary."' From these
and other cases it is evident that an aggregation required merely for
maximum economy or convenience does not qualify for the exception, whereas an aggregation to prevent certain destruction does.
But it is not clear how this exception will be applied to situations
falling between these two extremes.
The principal case does not establish clear guidelines. The court
apparently endorsed the ICC's rules of construction, but it avoided
their application because of the lack of evidence. Several shippers
testified that, in general, palletization reduces the likelihood of damage to motor truck cargo, but no evidence was introduced to show
that the specific commodities involved required aggregation. Hence,
refinement of the courts' position must await future litigation. Meanwhile, the Texas limited carrier is on notice that aggregating cargo
State v. Bilbo, 378 S.W.2d 871 (1964).
'W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., 79 M.C.C. 335 (1959); Jesse Coonrod Johnson, 61 M.C.C.
783 (1953); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 53 M.C.C. 277 (1951).
'R. Q. Black, 64 M.C.C. 443, 446 (1955).
'W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., 79 M.C.C. 335, 358 (1959).
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normally transportable by a regular common carrier will not extend
his authority unless he can meet a substantial burden of proof that
aggregation is required by the inherent nature of the commodities
involved.
E.L.Y.

Eminent Domain - Newspaper Publicity Prior to Trial
Award Set Aside
The day before a condemnation proceeding a newspaper article
appeared entitled "City Offers $12,717, Owner Asks $400,000."'

All the commissioners who were to decide the case had read the
newspaper article. After polling the commissioners collectively as to
any bias, the court instructed them to disregard completely any facts
or figures contained in the article. Although they stated that they
would not be prejudiced against either party, they were not polled
separately or advised specifically what information was improper for
consideration. Held: Lack of bias must be shown with reasonable
certainty. The trial court abused its discretion in proceeding to trial

over objection. Seidfried v. City of Charlottesville, -Va.-,

142

S.E.2d 556 (1965).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized that it was
within the discretion of the trial court to deny a motion for a new
trial based on misconduct of a juror. However, the court noted:
It cannot be overlooked that the article was published on the afternoon immediately preceding the trial and that the prejudicial information was freshly imprinted upon the minds of the commissioners.
Under these circumstances, the mental processes of at least one of the
commissioners could have been subtly influenced by the article during
the trial of the case, and we cannot say with reasonable certainty
whether or not the award was affected.'
In Texas, the burden is upon the movant or defendant to show
"that there has been created in the public mind so great a prejudice
as will prevent him from receiving a fair trial."' The determination
of whether bias is present is largely within the discretion of the trial
judge. The Court of Criminal Appeals has said: "Newspaper publicity and an opinion formed therefrom alone will not be sufficient
Seidfried v. City of Charlottesville, - Va. __, 142 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1965).
'Id. at 561.
'Handy v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 3, 138 S.W.2d $41, 546 (1940).
1
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to disqualify a juror. . . .We are impressed with the soundness of
the court's discretion."" Texas is in accord with the majority rule
which requires proof of actual and present existence of an unfriendly sentiment traceable to the cause stated-something to indicate with a reasonable degree of directness that an adverse impression was made by the publication at the time and is still active
in the minds of people.'
In recent years, pre-trial publicity has received much attention.'
The applicable Texas statutes' seem to preclude a position as farreaching as that held by the Virginia court. It is probable, however,
that greater consideration will be given to claims of jury bias and
prejudice in both civil and criminal cases.
G.B.R.

Estates - Property Settlement and Child Support
Agreement
In a property settlement agreement, Warren Bates agreed to provide child support payments of $150.00 per month until his daughters reached the age of eighteen, and to pay his wife $ 50.00 per month
for the same period in exchange for her homestead rights. The divorce
decree adopted and confirmed the settlement agreement. Mr. Bates
subsequently remarried and executed a will leaving all of his property
to his new wife and appointing her independent executrix of his
estate. After his death, his former wife, individually and as next
friend of her daughters, sued his estate for the support and property
payments due and for anticipatory sums equal to those provided for
in the agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff in the amount requested. The Corpus Christi Court of
4 Id. at 546, 547.
5 56 AM. JuR. VENUE

§

71 (1947).

5 E.g., the Supreme Court remanded the conviction in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965), because of television coverage in the courtroom, an issue related to pre-trial publicity.
7

TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2134 (1948).

The following persons shall be disqualified to serve as jurors in any particular
case. . . . 4. Any person who has a bias or prejudice in favor or against either
of the parties.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 257.
A change of venue may be granted in civil cases upon application of either
party, supported by his own affidavit and the affidavit of at least three credible
persons, residents of the county in which the suit is pending, for the following cause: (a) That there exists in the county where the suit is pending
so great a prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial. . ..
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Civil Appeals stated the issue as being: "whether or not a decedent's
estate can be held liable for amounts accruing after his death by
virtue of a written agreement for child support payments . .. and
limited installment payments for renunciation and homestead rights."1
Held, afirmed: Unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the
contract, the estate of a deceased father is liable for the obligations
created by a property settlement agreement. Hutchings v. Bates,
393 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
At common law, a father's estate is not liable for support payments to his children in the absence of an agreement In many
states, however, a parent may bind his estate by a settlement agreement, and a court, in a divorce decree, may create an enforceable obligation against the estate.' When suit is brought against the executor,
it is the language of the agreement or decree which determines
whether the estate is obligated to fulfill the decedent's duties."
In the instant case, one of first impression in Texas, the court
rested its decision upon the property settlement agreement rather
than upon the divorce decree which incorporated the agreement.
The case was tried on summary judgment. The trial court refused
to admit evidence concerning the intention of the parties, and interpreted the contract within its four corners. The appellant argued
that the lack of a provision expressly binding the estate, or a clear
implication to that effect, indicated that it was the intention of the
parties that the obligations under the contract would cease at the
death of one of the parties. However, the court held that the agreement was enforceable against the estate bcause there was no clear
language to the contrary.
The court's presumption apparently arises from the circumstances
surrounding the making of the property settlement agreement.
It seems to us that when a husband and wife who are faced with
divorce in a pending action, undertake their solemn written agreement
and set forth the terms of their property settlement, and the obligation
of the husband and father as to support payments for little children,
issues of such marriage, they do so impressed with the most poignant
emotions and directed by the most solicitous of responsibilities....'
He knew he was mortal and that his death could intervene before his
small daughters should attain the ages of eighteen years, but he did
'Hutchings v. Bates, 393 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15, p. 691 (1950).
'Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. App. 608, 15 P.2d 511 (1932).
A.L.R.2d 1126 (1951).
'Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W.2d 30 (1948).
'Hutchings v. Bates, 393 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
2

See Annot.,

18
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not qualify his agreement to terminate the payments should he not
survive.'
While the court did not distinguish between the child support payments and the payments to the former wife, it may be argued that
circumstances attending the formation of the contract would give
rise to presumptions favoring the continuation of payments to the
children, but not the continuation of payments to the wife. Ideally,
however, the court should construe the instrument without resort-

ing to inferences. Nevertheless, the mandate, if not the logic, of
the case is certain-a property settlement agreement will bind a
decedent's estate unless it contains a clear expression that the obli-

gations shall cease at death.
G.M.L.

Estate Tax

-

Computation of Gift Tax Credit

In 1958, Thomas E. Greenaway made an inter-vivos transfer of
securities on which he paid a gift tax of $5,103.10. In 1959, he paid
gift taxes of $55,138.00 on five gifts of cash and securities. After
Mr. Greenaway's death in 1959, the executor of his estate included
the transfered property in the gross estate for estate tax purposes,
and sought a credit against estate taxes for the gift taxes previously
paid. Section 2012 limits the credit to the lower of the gift tax
actually paid or the amount of the estate tax attributable to the inclusion of the gift property in the estate.' The executor claimed a
credit of $52,581.46 which was the lower of the total gift taxes
paid ($60,241.26) and the estate tax attributable to the inclusion
of all the gifts in the gross estate. The Internal Revenue Service
separated the gifts made in 1958 from those made in 1959 and
computed the limitations separately. The Service found that the
gift tax paid in 1958 was $5,103.10, while the estate tax attributable
to the inclusion of the gift property was $9,091.45. In 1959, the
attributable estate tax would have been $43,490.01, and the gift
taxes paid on the four separate transfers was $55,138.16. Totaling
the lower figure for each year, the Service allowed a credit of
$48,593.11, and assessed a deficiency. The executor paid the deficiency and sued for refund in the district court. Held: The execu0

id. at 343.

'INT.

REV. CoDi

of 1954, § 2012.
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tor's method of computing the gift tax credit did not conform to
the regulations. Although the position adopted by the Revenue
Service may have been inappropriate, the executor did not sustain

his burden of showing that the tax was overpaid. Burns v. United
States, 242 F.2d 947 (1965).
A third method for computing the gift tax credit, which was not
used by either party, is the one required by the regulations: "When
more than one gift is included in the gross estate, a separate computation of the two limitations is to be made for each gift."2 Since there
were six gifts, one made in 1958 and five in 1959, the credit would
be the total of the lower of the gift tax paid on each transfer, and
the estate tax attributable to the inclusion of each separate gift in

the gross estate. This method would have reduced the allowable gift
tax credit.
In 1946 the Tax Court in Budlong v. Commissioner3 supported a
method similar to that adopted by the executor in the instant case.
Its validity was not raised again until Chapman v. Commissioner.4
In that case the Tax Court refused to decide among the proposed
methods of computation as the result was the same under each. In
the instant case, the district court found that the 1948 revision of
the Code superseded the result in Budlong. Since the method proposed by the regulations was not advanced by either party, the court
did not have the opportunity to uphold that method. However, the
court stated, "The regulation is obviously based on an unusually
clear statement of Congressional intent and, therefore, is reasonable
and consistent with the statute."'
G.M.L.

Procedure -

Libel Defenses
stitutional Issues

-

Failure to Present Con-

Wallace Butts, former athletic director at the University of Georgia, sued Curtis Publishing Company for libel and obtained a judgment, after remittitur, of $460,000. On motion for a new trial under
federal rule 60(b),' Curtis asserted for the first time that the case
' Treas. Reg. § 20.2012-1(b)(2) (1953).
38 T.C. 284 (1946).
432 T.C. 599 (1959).
'Burns v. United States, 242 F.2d 947 (1965).

'Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
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was controlled by the constitutional principles established in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan The Times case was not decided until
two and one-half months after the trial court had rendered judgment for Butts. However, the petition for writ of certiorari presenting identical constitutional claims as those raised by Curtis in its
motion for a new trial had been filed and certiorari granted in the
Times case prior to the filing of the complaint in the instant case.
Butts argued that Curtis' constitutional claims were not timely
raised or preserved in the trial court. The trial court denied Curtis'
motion. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that Curtis, in another
libel suit arising out of the same magazine article, was represented by
the same law firm which represented the New York Times Company
in the Times case. Therefore, Curtis should have known of the constitutional arguments presented in Times. Held: Curtis clearly waived
any right it may have had to challenge the verdict and judgment on
any of the constitutional grounds approved in Times. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 34 U.S.L. Week 2048 (5th Cir. Jul. 23, 1965).
The legal conclusion that a party may forfeit a constitutional
right through failure timely to assert that right has long been
established in our procedural law.' Generally, the test applied by
the courts to determine if such waiver has occurred is "whether the
defendant has had 'a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to
the claimed right heard and determined by the . . . court.'" However, there is an exception to this established rule. If subsequent to a
trial or hearing but before a final decision by the trial or appellate
court the substantive law is changed, it is the duty of the court to
apply the law as ultimately determined.! The exception has had a
rather limited application. It has only been applied in those cases in
which there was no express waiver and the court determined that
application of the rule would result in a "miscarriage of justice."'
In the instant case, the court decided that Curtis "was charged
with knowledge, through its interlocking battery of able and distinguished attorneys, of the issues involved in the Times case." 7 The
test of "reasonable opportunity" was met, and silence on the issue
2376

U.S. 254 (1964).

'Yakus

v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Kewanee Oil and Gas Co. v. Mosshamer,
58 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1932); but see, Reece v. State of Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) indicating that the right to make a timely assertion presupposes an opportunity to exercise that
right.
4
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
'See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73 (1943); Hormel v. Helvering, 312
U.S. 552 (1941).
6 Hormel v. Helvering, supra note 5.
734 U.S.L. Week 2048 (5th Cir. Jul. 23, 1965).
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constituted waiver. However, the court's holding does not imply
that a party is deemed to have notice of constitutional arguments
presented in a petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court might have held
contra to Curtis' allegations on the constitutional issues was not
determinative. Rather, it was Curtis' failure to invoke a constitu-

tional claim, of which it had peculiar knowledge, in a proper manner
and at a proper time which was fatal and amounted to "an inten-

tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' s

J.W.B.

Texas Dead Man's Statute
ceased -

-Transaction

with De-

Automobile Passenger

Plaintiff was a guest in an automobile involved in a one car accident in which the driver was killed and the plaintiff severely injured.
Plaintiff sued the administrator of the deceased driver's estate. The
trial court ruled that she was barred by the Dead Man's Statute'
from testifying to any events, including the accident, which occurred
after she became a passenger in decedent's car. Since there were no
other witnesses to the accident, the trial court granted judgment for
the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. Held, affirmed:
In an action against a deceased driver's estate, an injured passenger
may not testify to decedent's conduct preceding and accompanying
the accident. Grant v. Griffin, 390 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1965).
The issue in the instant case was the meaning of the word "transaction" as used in the Dead Man's Statute. The court distinguished
its holding in Harper v. Johnson,2 a case which involved a two-car
collision. There the injured driver was permitted to testify to the
deceased driver's conduct. A "transaction" was defined as a consensual relationship, and not an "impersonal, fortuitous and involuntary relationship."'
'Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
1 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (1925)

reads as follows:

In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement
by, the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party . . .
2 162 Tex. 117, 345 S.W.2d 277 (1961).
5

1d. at 280.
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In Grant, the court found that the plaintiff voluntarily entered
the automobile and thereby agreed as a matter of law that the decedent's duty to her would be governed by the Guest Statute.' This
was held to create a consensual arrangement and, therefore, the accident was a "transaction" between the parties.
The distinction made by the court overlooks the realities of the
occurrence. While the plaintiff agreed as a matter of law to have
her rights governed by the Guest Statute,' she did not consent to the
accident. The Dead Man's Statute has been criticized as unsound
both in theory and in practice." The result in the Grant case reinforces the argument that the Dead Man's Statute should be repealed.

J.D.T.

4

TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (1960.) The statute provides that no person
who is a guest without payment in a motor vehicle has a cause of action for death or injuries unless the accident was intentional on the part of the driver or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the right of others.
5See note 4 supra.
a 1 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. 1956).

